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In 1999 the Canadian Standards Association (CSA) embarked on an 
initiative to both revise the existing Offshore Standards that were 
adopted in the early 1990s and move forward to harmonize them with 
the ISO Offshore Structures Code.  The updating process followed a 
consensus approach with care taken to ensure that due process was 
followed.  Changes to CSA S471 General Requirements, Design 
Criteria, the Environment, and Loads, which sets the overall principles 
of the CSA Offshore Structures Code, were small, but there has been 
extensive revision of the Annex E Determination of ice loads as well 
as the addition of two new annexes, Annex H Accidental loads and 
Annex I Ice accretion on offshore structures.  The revised CSA Code 
sets a basis for harmonization with the ISO Offshore Structures Code.  
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The protection of human life and the preservation of environmental 
quality are fundamental goals of modern society.  Developing offshore 
resources, often in hazardous environments, presents a challenge in 
meeting these goals of society while still providing economic 
solutions.  The petroleum industry and governmental regulatory 
authorities have faced this challenge in the exploitation of offshore 
petroleum resources.  Extensive experience was developed in the Gulf 
of Mexico and the North Sea in this regard, and codes of practice have 
been developed for these areas.  With the advent of offshore 
exploration in Canadian waters in the 1970s and the potential for 
offshore production, a program to develop a Canadian offshore 
structures code was initiated by the Canadian Standards Association 
(CSA) in 1984.  The CSA Offshore Structures Code was developed 
during the late 1980s, and was subsequently adopted in the early 
1990s.  The Code comprises five standards; namely CAN/CSA-S471-
92 General Requirements, Design Criteria, the Environment, and 
Loads, CAN/CSA-S472-92 Foundations, CAN/CSA-S473-92 Steel 
Structures, S474-94 Concrete Structures, and S475-93 Sea Operations.  
These Standards have been used in Canada and elsewhere, particularly 
because of their treatment of extreme environments; i.e. sea ice, 
icebergs, and combinations of them with other environmental factors 
such as waves and earthquakes. 
 
CSA has a requirement that every 5 years its codes be reaffirmed or 
revised in order to maintain their currency.  By the late 1990s there 
was experience with the design and operation of the Hibernia offshore 
GBS, as well as with the design and procurement of systems for the 
Sable, Terra Nova and White Rose offshore field developments.  
While these systems are deployed off the East Coast of Canada, their 
design and procurement was international in scope.  Given the 
international nature of the offshore petroleum industry, the desirability 
of harmonization between the CSA Offshore Structures Code and 
international codes was apparent.  In 1999 the CSA Strategic Steering 
Committee on Offshore Structures, which had overseen the 
development of the original Standards, embarked on an initiative to 
both revise the Standards that were adopted in the early 1990s and 
move forward for harmonization with the International Organization 
for Standardization (ISO) Offshore Structures Code.  This paper will 
present a general overview of the updating process and provide more 
detail on the changes to CSA S471 General Requirements, Design 




The work for the updating of the Code was carried out under the 
direction of the CSA Strategic Steering Committee on Offshore 
Structures (SSCOS).  The SSCOS set up two Technical Committees to 
review, revise and approve the five standards.  One Technical 
Committee had responsibility for S471, S472 and S475, and the other 
Technical Committee had responsibility for S473 and S474.  The 
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SSCOS oversaw the process, providing Terms of Reference for each 
of the Technical Committees, guidance on membership and secured 
financial support for the process.  Responsibility for the technical 
review and balloted approval, however, rested solely with the 
Technical Committees.  The Terms of Reference called for review and 
updating of the five existing CSA Standards, and participation in ISO 
offshore standards development, with the objective of harmonizing the 
CSA Offshore Standards with the ISO Offshore Standards.  The scope 
of the CSA Standards review was to only correct what may be wrong 
or dangerous, and to ensure they are up to date. 
 
To describe the process, some explanation of the context in which 
CSA operates is necessary.  CSA is a Standards Development 
Organization (SDO), one of four such organizations in Canada.  The 
Standards Council of Canada (SCC), the body which oversees 
Canada’s National Standards System, sets terms and conditions that 
must be followed by SDOs for their standards to be accepted as 
National Standards.  SCC is a Crown Corporation of the Government 
of Canada, and has a mandate to promote efficient and effective 
standardization.  It is Canada’s official representative to the 
International Organization for Standardization (ISO).  To be approved 
as a National Standard of Canada SCC requires that the following 
criteria be adhered to in the development of a standard: x follow a consensus with a balanced committee of producers, 
consumers and other interests, x undergo a public review process,    x not restrain trade, x be consistent with international standards as well as pertinent 
national standards.  
CSA follows these criteria so that CSA Standards may be accepted as 
National Standards of Canada.  As a consequence CSA Technical 
Committees must comprise a balanced membership from four groups; 
owner/operator (oil companies), supplier/fabricators (engineering 
companies and contractors), general interest (universities, research 
organizations and general public) and regulatory authorities 
(governmental, classification societies).  Each of the CSA Offshore 
Standards Technical Committees has a minimum of four and a 
maximum of six members from each group.  Development of the 
technical content of the Standard follows the consensus process, which 
means “substantial agreement, that is much more than a simple 
majority, but not necessarily unanimity”.  Final adoption of a standard 
requires a recorded vote or a letter ballot with three options; x Affirmative, x Affirmative with Comments, or x Negative with Reason. 
Negative votes or ballots must be addressed by the Chair of the 
Technical Committee through consultation with the individual or 
individuals involved, and the disposition of them documented.  
Approval of a Standard requires that more than half of the Technical 
Committee vote in the affirmative, and of those voting at least two 
thirds are affirmative.  Thus a Negative vote need not prevent adoption 
of a Standard.   
 
The work of the Technical Committees leading up to the balloting was 
assisted by a number of working groups set up to examine specific 
areas.  A series of meetings of the Technical Committees were held 
over the period 2001 through 2003, at which consensus was reached 
on the technical content of the revisions.  By the time of presentation 
of this paper, it is likely all five CSA Standards will have been 
balloted and acceptance is expected for all of them.  As can be seen 
there is a very deliberate process that must be followed for a standard 
to be accepted as a National Standard of Canada. 
 
 
BACKGROUND TO S471 GENERAL REQUIREMENTS, 
DESIGN CRITERIA, THE ENVIRONMENT, AND LOADS 
 
The CSA Offshore Structures Code uses limit states design procedures 
to accommodate the uncertainties in the environment and associated 
loads, as well as uncertainties in structure resistance.  The 
fundamentals of the approach are set out in the S471 Standard (CSA, 
1992). The following design objectives are indicated: x structures and foundation can sustain all anticipated load and 
deformations with an acceptable level of safety, x adequate measures are taken to mitigate consequences of 
accidents, x there is sufficient durability for normal operations and to   
minimize material degradation, x there is system ductility. 
To meet these objectives it is often perceived that there must be a 
trade-off between cost and safety.  The purpose of a code is to set 
adequate levels of safety and provide guidance on achieving them.  
The question is how to quantify these levels.  The approach followed 
in the CSA code is well described by Jordaan and Maes (1991): 
The basic direction taken in the Canadian Standards Association 
(CSA) calibration was to use the simple premise of consistent and 
adequate safety to the individual working on the installation.  The 
analysis of the cost and safety trade-off was not used as a 
calibration tool. 
Thus in the CSA Standards there is no trade-off between safety and 
cost. 
 
The design approach of the Standard defines two limit states: x Ultimate limit states: limit states concerned with safety of life and 
environmental protection. x Serviceability limit states: those that restrict the normal use or 
occupancy of the structure or affect its durability. 
There is a further definition of two safety classes of the ultimate limit 
state for verifying the safety of the structure or any of its structural 
elements: x Safety Class 1: for loading conditions where failure would result in 
great risk to life or a high potential for environmental damage. x Safety Class 2: for loading conditions where failure would result in 
small risk to life and a low potential for environmental damage. 
To meet the design objectives for safety, target reliability levels have 
been established that were subsequently used for calibrating the design 
limit states.  The target reliability levels selected are outlined in 
Table 1.  Setting such levels is not a trivial task.  Jordaan and Maes 
(1991) presented arguments for these values, based on other risks 
encountered by individuals in society.  For example, in Canada the 
annual risk of fatality from motor vehicle accidents is about 2 x 10-4.  
It was proposed that a target value comfortably below this be selected, 
say Pf = 10
-5 for Safety Class 1 (reliability = 1 – Pf).  Less demanding 
levels were set for Safety Class 2 and serviceability.  Other standards 
set similar reliability levels, e.g. NORSOK (1999) and the Joint 
Committee on Structural Safety (2001).  Note that the CSA Standard 
and the noted standards use an annual probability of failure rather than 











Table 1  Safety Classes and Reliability Levels 
 
Safety Class Consequence of Failure Target Annual 
Reliability Level 
Safety Class 1 Great risk to life or a 
high potential for 
environmental damage 
0.99999 = (1 – 10-5) 
Safety Class 2 Small risk to life and a 
low potential for 
environmental damage 
0.999 = (1 – 10-3) 
Serviceability Impaired function 0.9 = (1 – 10-1) 
 
Reliability considers both the uncertainty of loads, environmental and 
other, as well as the resistance or strength of the structure.  Design to 
the prescribed reliability levels requires partial factors for both loads 
and the resistance.  The values of the partial factors were calibrated for 
various loads and load combinations in a series of studies carried our 
by Maes (1986a and 1986b).   
 
In addition to general requirements for design, the Standard provides 
guidance on describing environment conditions and the use of 
environmental parameters in determining environmental loads and 
load combinations.  Environmental conditions identified include 9wind, 9 air and sea temperature, 9 snow and ice accretion, 9waves, 9 currents, 9water level, 9marine growth, 9 sea ice and icebergs, 9 seabed geology, and 9 earthquakes. 
These conditions have to be described, assessed and site-specific data 
assembled to quantify them. 
 
The treatment of loads and load combinations addresses 9 permanent loads, 9 operational loads, 9 accidental loads, and 9 environmental loads. 
Environmental loads are in turn sub-divided into those due to 9waves and current, 9wind, 9 ice, and 9 seismic effects. 
Environmental loads can be frequent, such as wind or wave loads, or 
rare, due to earthquakes or iceberg impact.  These two categories of 
environmental loads are treated separately in the Standard. 
i. Frequent environmental processes produce many loads over the 
course of a year.  For both Safety Class 1 and Safety Class 2, 
specified frequent environmental loads, Ef, shall have an annual 
probability of exceedance, PE, not greater than 10
-2.   
ii. Rare environmental events occur less than once a year.  For 
Safety Class 2, specified loads shall have an annual probability of 
exceedance, PE, not greater than 10
-2.  For Safety Class 1, 
specified loads shall have an annual probability of exceedance, 
PE, that lies in the range 10
-4 to 10-3.  Rare environmental loads 
need not be considered for events have an annual probability of 
occurrence of less than 10-4. 
The concept of companion frequent environmental processes was 
introduced to provide guidance on specified loads for the simultaneous 
occurrence of the principal frequent environmental process or 
principal rare environmental event with another frequent principal 
environmental process.  For principal processes or events such as 
waves, wind, current, sea ice, earthquakes or icebergs, stochastically 
dependent, stochastically independent and mutually exclusive 
companion frequent environmental processes were identified.  Factors 
were given in Table 6.1(b) (CSA, 1992) to be applied to the specified 
frequent load, Ef, associated with stochastically dependent and/or 
stochastically independent companion frequent environmental process 
and added to the loads from the principal process of event.  
 
Table 6.2 in S471 (CSA, 1992) identifies a total of 10 load 
combinations for Safety Class 1 and Safety Class 2 of ultimate limits 
states and the serviceability limit state.  For each load combination, 
load factors are given to be applied to the specified loads, be they 
permanent, operational, environmental or accidental.  These loads 
factors were derived from the aforementioned calibration studies. 
 
The 1992 edition of S471 contained appendixes with information on 
safety classes, sources of environmental data, wind load 
determination, wave and current loads, determination of ice loads, 
earthquakes, and relevant standards, codes and recommended practice 
documents.  The appendixes did not form a mandatory part of the 
Standard.  Additionally there was a companion publication, CSA 
Special Publication S471.1, Commentary to CSA Standard 
CAN/CSA-S471,that provided clause-specific background and 
information. 
 
REVISONS TO S471 GENERAL REQUIREMENTS, 
DESIGN CRITERIA, THE ENVIRONMENT, AND LOADS 
 
As mentioned, the original Standard was published as CAN/CSA-
S471-92 in 1992.  The basic layout and structure of the revised version 
of the Standard, to be published in 2004, remains the same.  In 
summary the significant changes include better definition of 
operational loads, additions to load combinations, revisions to the load 
factors, new requirements and guidance for accidental loads, and new 
guidance on ice loads, and ice accretion.  Also the Commentary has 
been dropped, with significant parts of it incorporated as notes to the 
main body of the Standard.  The changes will each be discussed in 
more detail in the following sub-sections.   
 
Safety Classes and Reliability Levels 
 
The relation between target annual reliability levels and Safety Class 
has been moved from an appendix where it was non-mandatory to the 
main body of the Standard, where it is mandatory.  The values are 




The new Standard places additional emphasis on the potential benefits 
of system ductility in the assessment of system response to rare 
environmental and accidental loads.  In this regard, the Standard is 
following terrestrial building standards for response to seismic 
excitation in which the capacity for a specified level of ductility is 
designed into the structural system.  The Standard is not specific as to 
levels of ductility, but recognizes that, in the system response to rare 
environmental loads (seismic, icebergs, ice islands), and accidental 
loads, ductility and reserve strength should be considered.  The 
corollary to this recognition, however, is the expectation that, in the 
damaged condition, the system maintains its integrity.  To ensure this, 
the damaged structure or structural elements must meet the 
requirements of the appropriate damaged load case (Table 2), 
depending on the Safety Class of the structure.  This is to ensure safety 
to personnel and limit damage to the environment, and subsequent 
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Substantial improvements were made to the treatment of accidental 
loads (i.e. fires, explosions, ship collisions, dropped objects, etc.) in 
the Standard.  Requirements for prevention of accidental events have 
been added to mitigation and control of their consequences.  Annex H 
has been added to the Standard to provide additional guidance for the 
determination of accidental loads and the response of the structure to 
these loads.   
 
The accidental loads revisions have drawn upon guidance from the 
North Sea community developed primarily as a result of the learnings 
from the Piper Alpha disaster in1988.  Following Piper Alpha the 
North Sea community undertook numerous initiatives to improve the 
guidance for accidental loads, and in particular, that for fires and 
explosions. These efforts are on going however significant 
advancements to date have been reflected in guidance including that 
from the Steel Construction Institute (1993), NORSOK (1998, 1999) 
and ISO (1999). The update to the S471 standard incorporates these 
advancements bringing the CSA S471 requirements more in-line with 
those of the North Sea.  
 
Among the new advancements in the standard is the requirement for 
the protection of structure, safety critical systems, pipework, and 
communications from the effects of accidental loads including, but not 
limited to, explosions, fire, projectiles and strong vibrations. With 
respect to projectiles and strong vibrations, these are effects that can 
follow the initial accidental event, such as an explosion or ship 
collision, and it is important to appropriately address these effects to 
prevent escalation of the event. For example, equipment exposed to an 
explosion may possibly become a projectile if the mounting 
arrangement cannot withstand the loads generated from an explosion. 
The projectile may then possibly cause escalation of the event by 
damaging other equipment, safety critical systems, piping, etc. For the 
case of strong vibration, this effect may be generated by explosions or 
ship collisions and may cause damage to critical components such as 
control systems and communications away from the vicinity of the 
event. 
 
The new guidance in S471 includes reference to standards such as 
NORSOK (1998, 1999) for assessment of loads and resistance, 
respectively. As well, the guidance on fire and explosions published 
by the Steel Construction Institute (1993) under the Fire and Blast 
Information Group (FABIG) is also cited. The reference to the FABIG 
documents includes reference to the original Interim Guidance Notes 
(IGN’s) and also the Technical Notes (TN’s) that update the IGN’s. 
Numerous TN’s have been published since the IGN’s were first 
published in 1992 and provide additional guidance in areas such as the 
response of structure against fires and explosions and the design of 
joints to resist explosions. For the control and mitigation of the 
topsides to fires and explosions, the recently published ISO 13702 
standard is also referenced.  
 
The work performed under CSA to update the standard in the area of 
accidental loads has been used as input to other recent initiatives in the 
area of fire and explosion loading including initiatives under the 
American Petroleum Institute (API), United Kingdom Offshore 
Operators Association (UKOOA) and the Health & Safety Executive 
(the UK offshore regulator). The S471 guidance has also been an 
important input into the new ISO standards through Canada’s direct 
participation on the ISO Accidental Actions Technical Panel 
responsible for drafting the provisions in the new ISO Offshore 
Structures Standards (under ISO TC 67 SC7). 
 
Annex H, like all the other annexes is not mandatory, however, part of 
it is written in normative language.  This has been done to facilitate its 
adoption by users of the Standard or regulatory authorities as an 




During the course of the revision of the Standard, corresponding ISO 
Standards were also reviewed.  While reviewing ISO/CD 19901-3 
Topsides (ISO, 2002), it became apparent that the partial load factors 
on operational loads in Table 6,2 were unsafe in certain circumstances.  
All operational loads were treated as being in one category, however 
modern practice is to divide operational (or live) loads into (i) 
operational loads of long duration and (ii) loads associated with short-
term operational activities.  Different partial load factors apply to each 
category of operational load.  It was deemed that a re-calibration 
exercise would be needed to establish load factors for the two 
categories of operational loads.  Subsequently it was decided to extend 
the re-calibration exercise to all loads.  The results of this exercise will 




The original calibration studies for the Standard were done in 1986 
(Maes, 1986a and 1986b).  Since that time there have been significant 
advances in the stochastic load models used for the offshore.  
Therefore a re-calibration of all the partial load factors in S471 was 
carried out (Maes, 2003).  Recalibrations were carried out at target 
annual reliability levels for Safety Class 1 and Safety Class 2 and a 
number of load combinations.  Guidance for the selection of stochastic 
models for the various parameters came from sources such as JCSS 
(2001).  Because the re-calibration was done against target annual 
reliability levels, the nature of distributions of resistance or strength 
parameters as well as distributions of the various load parameters was 
considered.  Complete details on the re-calibration exercise, the 
characteristics of the distributions used for the parameters, the load 
combinations specified and the selection of the corresponding partial 
load factors is given in detail in Maes (2003).  Based on this exercise a 
new Table 6.2 was prepared for the Standard, this one comprising 12 
load combinations and providing load factors for the associated loads.  
Load parameters include the following: 
Permanent, G 
 Dead, GD 
 Deformation, GR 
Operational, Q 
 Short-term, Q1 
 Long-term, Q2 
Environmental, E 
 Specified frequent, Ef 
 Specified rare, Er, and  
Accidental, A. 
 
In the 1992 edition of Table 6.2 there were three load combinations 
with load factors that were structural material dependent.  It was seen 
to be inappropriate to have “material-dependent” load factors, so these 
cases were removed and reference made, as appropriate, to S473 Steel 
Structures and S474 Concrete Structures.  The load combinations and 
load factors in the revised Table 6.2 are presented in abbreviated form 
in Table 2.  The 2004 edition of S471 contains extensive guidance 
notes on the use of Table 6.2, so Table 2 presented here should not be 
used without reference to the whole Standard.  It should also be noted 
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that these load factors are much closer to those in other modern 
standards. 
 





Ultimate limit states – Safety Class 1 
1 1.25 GD + GR + 1.45 Q1+ 1.2 Q2 + 0.7 Ef 
2 1.25 GD + GR + 1.15 Q1+ 1.7 Q2 + 0.7 Ef 
3 1.05 GD + GR + 1.15 Q1+ 1.35 Ef 
4 1.05 GD + GR + 1.15 Q1+ Er 
5 1.05 GD + GR + 1.15 Q1+ A   
6 damaged (1.05 or 0.9) GD + GR + Q1+ Ef 
Ultimate limit states – Safety Class 2 
7 1.05 GD + GR + 1.1 Q1+ 0.75 Q2 + 0.85 Ef 
8 1.05 GD + GR + 0.9 Q1+ 1.1 Q2 + 0.85 Ef 
9 1.05 GD + GR + 0.9 Q1+ Er 
10 damaged (1.05 or 0.9) GD + GR + Q1+ 0.7 Ef 
Ultimate limit states – Fatigue 
11 GD + GR + Q1+ Ef 
Serviceability limit states 
12 GD + GR + Q1+ 0.7 Ef 
 
Annex E  - Determination of ice loads 
 
The past 10 years have seen substantial advancement in the 
understanding of ice loads as a result of a number of research projects.  
This has been primarily due to the analysis of data collected from 
numerous field measurement projects (Timco et al, 1999), with 
Beaufort Sea experience being most valuable, plus the addition of new 
data from measurements of ice forces on the Confederation Bridge 
(Brown, 2001).  The new insights and knowledge gained have been 
used in revising this Annex (CSA, 2004). 
 
More guidance is given on application of probabilistic methods to 
determine ice loads for the annual probability levels called for in the 
Standard.  Better environmental data are now available.  Probabilistic 
methods have moved into the mainstream of design.  More guidance is 
given on characterizing frequent environmental processes and rare 
environmental events.   
 
For ice loads a clearer distinction is now made between pressures for 
global load and local load determination.  This clears up confusion 
that arose in the older editions.  Global and local pressures will be 
explained in turn. 
a. Ice pressures for global design of stability of structures are 
now broken into two categories, depending on aspect ratio (width of 
structure/ice thickness). 
i. Low aspect ratio (narrow structure) 
Pressure, p, is given by 
 
p = Cp A
Dp                                                                       (1) 
 
 A  = the nominal contact area 
 Cp = a coefficient 
 Dp = a negative exponent 
 Cp and Dp can be either deterministic values or 
normally distributed values that can be found in 
Table E.1 of Annex E. 
ii. High aspect ratio (wide structure) 
Pressure, p, is given by 
 
p = Cp’ h
Dp’ (W/h)Ep’                                                       (2) 
 
 W = nominal contact width 
 h = nominal ice thickness  
 Cp’, Dp’ and Ep’ = constants from measurement, see 
Table E.2 of Annex E. 
Note that these changes to the definition of global ice loads, taking 
into account aspect ratio, lead to greater commonality with Russian 
codes for ice loads.  The constants in the two tables mentioned, E.1 
and E.2, used for calculating global loads depend on the severity of the 
sea ice regime being considered.  Three regimes have been defined, 
Zone 1 for the Arctic (annual freezing degree days 3000 to 4000 oC-
days), Zone 2, Labrador Coast (annual freezing degree days 
approximately 2000 oC-days), and Zone 3, temperate regions such as 
Newfoundland and Gulf of St. Lawrence (annual freezing degree days 
1200 oC-days or less).  Average pressures are reduced by about a 
factor of 2 from Zone 1 to Zone 2 and another factor of 2 from Zone 2 
to Zone 3. 
 
b. Ice pressures for local design 
Separate specification of local ice pressures within contact areas less 
than 5 or 10 m2 are required for design of shell or stiffening elements.  
What is being defined here are pressures on smaller areas within the 
nominal contact area, termed “design area”, aL, see Figure 1.  Local 
ice pressure, ze,  is defined by  
 
  > @^ `PD lnlnln0  eZe zFxz                                 (3) 
 
where  
xo is offset of distribution, D represents the dependence of pressure on contact area, and  P is an exposure factor.  
For annual pressures at probability levels 10-2 and 10-4, Fz(ze) is 0.99 
and 0.9999, respectively.  Based on measurements from ships,  
 
 D = Bp aL -0.7                                                                           (4) 
 
where  
aL is the “design” area, and 
Bp is an empirical constant.  
Further, the exposure is given by  
 
 P = 1.4 nt                                                                            (5) 
 
where  
n is the annual average number of interactions, and 
t is the average duration of impacts, s.  
 
Nominal contact area a
Design
area aL
Area within nominal contact area
 
779
Figure 1  Schematic illustrating design area, aL. 
 
Quantitative information on pack ice driving forces has been added in 
Annex E.  Such information helps set an upper limit on the force that 
can be transmitted through pack ice to a structure.  Pack ice forces 
often correspond to ridge building, but can also relate to floe splitting, 
rafting or other out of plane mechanisms.  Based on extensive field 
measurements and an analysis of them by Croasdale et al (1992), the 
following expression is proposed 
 












    (6) 
 
where  
FDF is the limiting force condition, MN/m,  
W is the width over which the pack ice forces are acting, m, 
h is the ice thickness, m, and  
 f is a coefficient defining the probability distribution for FDF. 
 
Annex I  - Ice accretion on offshore structures 
 
he new edition of S471 has added Annex I, providing guidance on ice 
accretion on fixed or floating offshore structures.  It notes that ice 
accretion represents not only a load and stability hazard, but also an 
operational concern; e.g. slippery decks, ladders and handrails; ice 
encasing winches, derricks and valves; ice on radar antennas; and ice 
can interfering with life saving and fire-fighting equipment.  This 
annex provides the designer with some up-to-date references 
pertaining to ice accretion on offshore structures, but is not intended to 
give detailed methods for estimating ice accretion loads. The 
information is provided on the following topics:  9 explanation of ice accretion sources,  9 generation of sea spray,  9 ice accretion,  9 Canadian offshore icing climatology, and  9 references to other relevant standards. 
It refers to NORSOK N-003 (1999) as the only standard that provides 




The consensus process, as implemented by CSA,  has been followed 
to produce new edition of S471.  It contains a number of 
improvements over the 1992 edition, including better definition of 
operational loads, additions to load combinations, revisions to the load 
factors, and new guidance on ice loads, accidental loads and ice 
accretion.  The revised S471 is a good basis for moving forward to 




The authors would like to acknowledge the support of the members of 
CSA Technical Committee K152, members of the Working Groups 




Brown, T.G. (2001) “Four years of ice force observations on the 
Confederation Bridge”. Proc.16th Int. Conf on Port and Ocean 
Engineering under Arctic Conditions, Ottawa, August 12-17, 2001, 
Vol.1, pp. 285-298. 
 
Croasdale, K. R., Frederking, R., Wright B. and Comfort G. (1992) 
“Size effect on pack ice driving forces”. Proceedings, IAHR Ice 
Symposium, June 15-19, 1992, Banff, Alberta, Vol. 3, p. 1481-1496. 
 
CSA (1992) “CAN/CSA-S471-92 General requirements, design 
criteria, the environment and loads”. Published as a National 
Standard of Canada in 1992 by the Canadian Standards 
Association, 178 Rexdale Boulevard, Rexdale (Toronto), Ontario, 
Canada M9W 1R3. 
 
CSA (2004) “S471-04 General requirements, design criteria, the 
environment and loads”. Published as a National Standard of 
Canada in 2004 by the Canadian Standards Association, 5060 
Spectrum Way, Suite 100, Missisauga, Ontario, Canada L4W 5N6. 
 
ISO (1999) “ISO 13702  Petroleum and natural gas industries — 
Control and mitigation of fires and explosions on offshore 
production installations — Requirements and guidelines”. 
 
ISO (2002) “ISO/CD 19901-3  Petroleum and natural gas industries — 
Topsides structure” ISO TC 67/SC7 document N321.  
 
Joint Committee on Structural Safety (2001) “Probabilistic Model 
Code, Part 1 Basis of Design”. JCSS-OSTL/DIA/VROU-10-11-
2000, (www.jcss.ethz.ch). 
 
Jordaan, I.J., Maes, M.A. (1991) “Rationale for load specifications and 
load factors in the new CSA code for fixed offshore structures”. 
Can. J. Civ. Eng., Vol.18, pp. 454-464. 
 
Maes, M.A. (1986a) “A study of a calibration of the new CSA Code 
for Fixed Offshore Structures”. Technical Report No. 7.  Ottawa:  
Canada Oil and Gas Lands Administration, Environmental 
Protection Branch, March 1986. 
 
Maes, M.A. (1986b) “Calibration of design criteria in the New CSA 
Standard for Fixed Offshore Structures”. Technical Report No. 9.  
Ottawa:  Canada Oil and Gas Lands Administration, 
Environmental Protection Branch, October 1986. 
 
Maes, M.A. (2003) “Re-Calibration of partial load factors in 
CAN/S471 (2003)”. Report to Canadian Standards Association, 
April 2003. 
 
NORSOK (1999) “Actions and Action Effects”, NORSOK Standard 
N-003, Rev. 1. 
 
NORSOK (1998) “Design of Steel Structures”, NORSOK Standard N-
004, Rev. 1. 
 
Steel Construction Institute (1993) “Interim Guidance Notes for the 
Design and Protection of Topside Structures against Explosion and 
Fire”, P-112. 
 
Timco, G. W. Johnston, M., Frederking, R. (1999) “The NRC Ice 
Load Catalogue”. Proc.15th Int. Conf on Port and Ocean 
Engineering under Arctic Conditions, Helsinki, August 23-27, 1999, 
Vol.1, pp. 444-453. 
 
780
